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This paper uses an endogenous-growth model with overlapping generations to explore the
connection between ﬁscal federalism and economic growth. The analysis shows that federalism,
which allows public-good levels to be tailored to suit the diﬀering demands of young and old
consumers, who live in diﬀerent jurisdictions, increases the incentive to save. This stronger
incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital, and a byproduct of this




Fiscal federalism, under which provision of public goods is decentralized to subnational
governments, allows public consumption levels to be tailored to suit the preferences of a het-
erogeneous population. This beneﬁcial outcome, ﬁrst emphasized by Tiebout (1956) in a classic
paper, is achieved via sorting of individuals into demand-homogeneous jurisdictions, each of
which provides a diﬀerent amount of the public good. The drawbacks of federalism, which
have also been noted in the literature, include the sacriﬁce of scale economies due to smaller
jurisdiction sizes (Oates, 1972, Alesina and Spoalore, 1997), losses from interjurisdictional tax
competition when government revenue comes from taxation of a mobile tax base (Brueckner,
2004), and failure to properly account for public-good spillovers across jurisdictions (Oates,
1972, and Besley and Coate, 2003).1
A recent empirical literature explores a diﬀerent eﬀect of ﬁscal federalism by studying the
impact of decentralized public spending on economic growth. This inquiry was inspired in
part by the work of Oates (1993), who conjectured that better targeting of growth-enhancing
infrastructure investment under federalism could raise an economy’s growth rate. In a related
argument, Davoodi and Zou (1996) show that, if national and subnational public goods enter
as separate inputs in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, then growth maximiza-
tion requires an appropriate degree of ﬁscal decentralization, with the subnational spending
share matching its Cobb-Douglas exponent. The initial contributions to the empirical lit-
erature, which include Davoodi and Zou (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), and Xie, Zou and
Davoodi (1999), disconﬁrm Oates’ conjecture by ﬁnding a negative connection between ﬁscal
decentralization and growth, a result that could be consistent with excessive decentralization
under the Davoodi-Zou framework. However, the more-recent papers Lin and Liu (2000), Akai
and Sakata (2002), Stansel (2005) and Iimi (2005) all ﬁnd a positive relationship between
1decentralization and growth, suggesting that Oates may have been right after all.
Despite this intense empirical focus, little additional theoretical eﬀort has been devoted
to studying the decentralization-growth nexus. The present paper is intended to remedy this
omission in the literature. The analysis builds on the earlier work of Brueckner (1999), who
used an overlapping generations (OLG) model to show that, in a dynamic context, federalism
aﬀects the incentive to save. It does so by replacing a common tax burden, associated with
uniform national provision of the public good z, with head-tax burdens that diﬀer between
young and old consumers, who live in separate jurisdictions where z is provided at diﬀerent
levels in response to age-dependent demands. Federalism thus alters the time path of after-tax
income over the life cycle, thereby aﬀecting the economy’s level of saving.
Because Brueckner’s analysis relied on the traditional Diamond (1965) OLG model, this
diﬀerence in saving altered the economy’s steady-state capital intensity without aﬀecting its
growth rate, except in the transition between the “unitary” system (where a common z level
is provided nationally) and a federalist system. To generate results more closely linked to
the empirical literature, the present paper makes use of an endogenous-growth model with
overlapping generations, where the choice between the unitary and federalist systems aﬀects
the economy’s growth rate. The analysis adapts the OLG model of Yakita (2003), where
consumers invest in human capital while young to enhance their earning power in old age.
While education thus plays a key role in the analysis, the public good itself is assumed to
be unrelated to the educational process, instead representing goods such as health services,
transportation, public safety, recreation, etc. Relaxation of this assumption is left for future
work.
In common with other endogenous-growth models, a key feature of Yakita’s framework is
rising income over the life cycle, a consequence of the work-time sacriﬁce required for schooling
while young combined with the payoﬀ to this schooling in old age. Given this income pattern,
the public-good demands of the young and old are, respectively, low and high. While these
demands are fulﬁlled under the federalist system, where the young and old live in separate
jurisdictions, a unitary system provides a common, intermediate level of z.A sar e s u l t ,z rises
for the young and falls for the old in moving from federalism to a unitary system, and the head
2taxes paid by the two age groups move in step. But viewed from a single individual’s life-cycle
perspective, these changes reduce after-tax income when young while raising it when old. The
resulting alteration in the time path of income then reduces the incentive to save.
The lower saving incentive under the unitary system disrupts equilibrium in the market
for physical capital, requiring an adjustment that restores some of the lost savings. This
adjustment comes partly from a reduction in investment in human capital, achieved by a
decline in the share of a young person’s time devoted to schooling. Since this change raises
income for the young and lowers it for the old, the result is an oﬀsetting increase in the incentive
to save. But since the economy’s growth rate depends positively on the extent of investment
in human capital, moving to a unitary system ultimately depresses growth.
The analysis thus suggests that faster economic growth may be an additional beneﬁt of
ﬁscal federalism. However, in contrast to the conceptual work mentioned above, where output
and growth are directly tied to the provision of public goods, this result emerges from a model
in which federalism oﬀers nothing more than the ability to tailor z consumption to suit diﬀerent
demands. The model’s link between federalism and growth is thus quite indirect.
Like all of the Tiebout literature, the present model can be criticizedon the grounds that its
sorting assumption, under which the federalist population divides into demand-homogeneous,
young and old jurisdictions, is unrealistic. Despite the criticisms of various authors (see
Strumpf and Rhode (2003) for a recent contribution), casual empiricism nevertheless reveals
at least a weak tendency toward jurisdictional homogeneity like that presumed in the analysis.
In any case, like all models in the Tiebout tradition, the present one can be viewed as depicting
an idealized world while identifying a savings-induced link between federalism and growth that
may have more general relevance.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and characterizes
the steady-state equilibrium under ﬁscal federalism. Section 3 considers the unitary case,
and section 4 compares the federalist and unitary steady state solutions. Section 5 oﬀers
conclusions.
32. The Model and the Federalist System
The analysis relies on the model of Yakita (2003), modiﬁed to include a public good. In
the model, each consumer lives for two periods. When young, the consumer invests a portion
of his ﬁxed time allotment in schooling, with the remainder spent working. In old age, all time
is devoted to work, with labor productivity having been enhanced by earlier schooling. In each
period, the consumption bundle consists of a num´ eraire private good x and a public good z,
whose cost is ﬁnanced by a head tax. When young, the consumer saves a portion of his income
by investing in physical capital.
The consumption variables in the model are indexed both by a time subscript and by
a superscript indicating the consumer’s generation, or date of birth. Thus, xt
t denotes the
time-t consumption of individuals born at t, or equivalently, the consumption while young of
generation t (the one born at t). Similarly, xt
t+1 indicates the time-(t + 1) consumption of
individuals born at t, or equivalently, the consumption while old of generation t . Analogous
deﬁnitions apply to the public consumption levels zt
t and zt
t+1.
Generation t has a human capital level of ht
t when young and ht
t+1 when old. These levels




where et ∈ [0,1] is the share of time devoted to schooling for young individuals at time t.
The function φ satisﬁes φ(0) = 1, indicating that human capital remains constant over the life
cycle if no schooling is undertaken, as well as φ  > 0a n dφ   < 0, with the latter assumption
indicating diminishing returns to schooling. Note that these assumptions yield φ(et) > 1f o r
et > 0. In addition, note that if z were an education-related public good, then zt
t would be an
argument of φ along with et, greatly increasing the complexity of the analysis. Treatment of
this case could be a subject for future research.
While Yakita assumes that human capital is transmitted intergenerationally with decay,
the simpler assumption that young individuals fully inherit the human capital of their (old)




which says that the human capital of generation t when young equals the human capital of
generation t − 1w h e no l d .
Letting wt denote the time-t wage and st denote the savings of young consumers at time
t, the budget constraints for a member of generation t while young and old are, respectively,
xt
t + czt





t+1 + st(1 + rt+1). (4)
Note that the consumer’s labor supply per unit of time is equal to his human capital level, and
that rt+1 gives the interest rate prevailing at time t + 1. Note also that the cost per capita
per unit of the public good is equal to c, with the cost recovered via a head tax. Other tax
schemes are considered below.
With a single consumption good x, Yakita assumes that utility takes the logarithmic form
log x in each period, with a discount rate of ρ. Generalizing these assumptions to the present
two-good case, lifetime utility for generation t is equal to
α logxt










In maximizing utility, the optimal z’s are ﬁrst chosen conditional on st and et.T h ez solutions
are substituted into (5), and st is then chosen conditional on et. Finally, et is set optimally.
Under the federalist system, the individuals alive at a given time are separated into young
and old jurisdictions, each with a distinct public-good level. Therefore, the z levels in (5) can

















t +( 1 + rt+1)st

, (7)
where (1) is used to eliminate ht
t+1. In a steady-state equilibrium, where the wage w is constant
over time, inspection of (6) and (7) shows that, for any et > 0, zt
t <z t
t+1 holds (recall φ>1).
Thus, public-good consumption rises over the life cycle, reﬂecting the growth of income due to
human capital investment. Note that this conclusion relies on the fact that saving is positive,
which is required for the capital stock to be held by the population, as discussed below.
It is also true that the public-good consumption of the old individuals alive at time t,w h o
belong to generation t − 1, exceeds the consumption of the young at t. Lagging (7) by one














t by (2) (the human capital level of the old at t i sp a s s e do nt ot h e i r
children), it follows that (8) exceeds (6). This relationship, which holds both in and out of
a steady state, implies that at any given time, jurisdictions inhabited by the young provide
lower public-good levels than those inhabited by the old.
To derive the optimal level of saving, (6) and (7) are substituted along with corresponding












t +( 1 + rt+1)st

, (9)
an expression identical to the consumer objective function in Yakita’s single-good model. Max-












This saving solution is the same as Yakita’s, which shows that introduction of a public good
has no eﬀect in his model provided that preferences take the Cobb-Douglas form and z can be
6tailored to suit the diﬀerent demands of young and old individuals. As will be seen below, this
equivalence disappears under the unitary system, where a common public-good level must be
provided to the young and old at each time t.
Finally, et, the share of time devoted to schooling when young, is chosen to maximize






This condition says that et is optimal when the loss from additional time spent on schooling
while young (−wt) equals the present value of the gain when old.
On the production side of the model, capital is combined with a labor input, measured
by the human capital of workers, to produce x under constant returns. The intensive form of
the production function given by f(k), where k is capital per unit of labor input. Capital is
assumed to fully depreciate each period, so that its cost, inclusive of the return to investors,
is 1+r. As usual, the conditions f (kt)=1+rt and wt = f(kt) − ktf (kt) ≡ w(kt) then hold.
The economy’s capital stock in each period must equal total savings from the previous
period. To satisfy this requirement, the economy must generate positive savings even though
human capital investment leads to a rising time path of income, an outcome achieved by
adjustment of the interest rate. To derive the relevant equilibrium condition, let population
growth be absent, with the size of each generation normalized to unity. Then, labor supply at
time t +1i se q u a lt oLt =( 1− et+1)ht+1
t+1 + ht
t+1 =( 1− et+1)ht
t+1 + ht
t+1 =( 2− et+1)φ(et)ht
t,
using (1) and (2). Multiplying this expression by kt+1 thus gives the economy’s total capital
stock at t + 1, denoted Kt+1. But the resulting expression, (2 − et+1)φ(et)ht
tkt+1 must equal
total savings at t, which is given by the st solution in (8), recalling the unitary size of each
generation.
The steady-state version of this equilibrium condition is relevant for the analysis. In a
steady state, capital per worker, and hence the wage and interest rate, are constant over time,
as is the time devoted to schooling. The level of human capital, however, grows at the constant
proportional rate of φ(e), where e represents a steady-state value. Letting k denote capital











− (2 − e)φ(e)k = 0 (12)
in the steady state. Note that ht
t cancels and that f (k) replaces 1+rt+1 in (10) (the B function
is a shorthand for the long expression in (12), and the f superscript denotes the federalist case).
Eq. (12) provides one condition to solve for the two unknowns, k and e, and the other
condition comes from the steady-state version of (11). Cancelling the constant wage rate and
eliminating the interest rate, (11) reduces to the condition
f (k) − φ (e) = 0 (13)
in the steady state. This condition says that the returns to physical and human capital are
equal.
It is easily seen that (13) generates an upward sloping curve in (k,e) space, denoted the N
locus. As explained further below, Yakita shows that the curve generated by (12), denoted the
Bf locus, is downward sloping when a condition ensuring saddle-path stability of the steady
state is satisﬁed. In this case, the steady-state equilibrium, given by the intersection of the
locii, is unique. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1, which also contains a locus relevant
to the unitary case considered below.
Before proceeding, it is useful investigate the growth rates of key variables in the model.



















naturally matching the growth rate of human capital. Since capital per unit of labor (k)i s
constant, it follows that total capital also grows at the proportional rate of φ(e). By constant
returns, x output, as well as output per capita, then grow at this same rate.
83. The Unitary System
Under the unitary system, a common public-good level zt is provided to the young and old
individuals alive at t. Although the population is now contained in a single jurisdiction rather
than being divided into young and old jurisdictions, z’s cost per capita is assumed to remain
at c, reﬂecting the assumption that the good is a publicly produced private good.
The level of zt is chosen according to a weighted average of the preferences of the young
and old. Letting MRS denote the marginal rate of substitution between z and x, the condition
for choice of zt is
θ MRSt
t +( 1 − θ)MRS t−1
t = c, (15)
where θ ∈ (0,1). Note that, in contrast to (6) and (7), which apply to the young and old
members of a given generation, (15) involves the young and old of diﬀerent generations, whose
preferences are aggregated to determine public-good provision at time t. Observe also that,
while (15) corresponds to the Samuelson condition when θ =1 /2, the equation can capture
other decision rules where one group exerts political power disproportionate to its population
share.
Using (5) to compute MRS, and using the budget constraint (3) and the lagged version of
(4) to eliminate the x’s, (15) becomes
θ
β(wt(1 − et)ht
t − st − czt)
αzt
+( 1 − θ)
β(wtht−1
t +( 1+rt)st−1 − czt)
αzt
= c. (16)






t − st)+( 1 − θ)(wtht−1
t +( 1 + rt)st−1)

. (17)
Referring to (6) and (8), it is apparent that the solution in (17) is a weighted average of
the time-t young and old public-good levels under the federalist system. In other words,
zt = θzt
t +( 1− θ)zt−1
t . Recalling that zt−1
t >z t
t holds, it follows that, for given values of
the e, h,a n ds variables, the unitary zt is larger than the public-good level of the young
9under federalism at time t (zt >z t
t) and smaller than the federalist level of the old at time t
(zt <z t−1
t ).
To ﬁnd the level of saving under the unitary system, it is useful to ﬁrst solve for saving
conditional on the public-good levels and then substitute the relevant z solutions using (17).
This conditional saving solution can be generated by simply subtracting public-good costs from















Then, substituting into (18) the zt solution from (17) and the zt+1 solution found by updating





(1 + ρ)(α + β)
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(1 + rt+1)(2 + ρ)(α + β)

θ(wt+1(1 − et+1)ht+1














t are used. In addition, focusing on the
steady state, where saving grows at the proportional rate φ(e), allows all the saving variables
in (18) to be expressed in terms of st. In particular, st+1 = φ(e)st and st−1 = st/φ(e).


















































− (2 − e)φ(e)k = 0 (24)
(B’s superscript refers to the unitary case). Like (12), this condition generates a curve in (k,e)
space, which is denoted the Bu locus. It can be shown that the previous steady-state condition
for choice of e, given by (13), continues to apply, so that the previous N locus in Figure 1
remains relevant.
4. Comparing the Federalist and Unitary Steady States
4.1. Main analysis
To compare the steady states under federalism and the unitary system, the positions of Bf
and Bu locii in Figure 1 must be compared. To do so, the magnitudes of the Ω and Φ terms
in (24), which account for the diﬀerence between the previous equilibrium condition (12) and
(24), must be evaluated. The following result emerges:
Lemma. On the Bu locus, the inequalities 0 < Ω < 1 and Φ > 1 are satisﬁed.
Proof: The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two terms in Bu(k,e) from (24) is necessarily positive
on the Bu locus, where (24) is satisﬁed, which means that (1 − e)∆ − (1 + ρ)φ(e)Γ/f (k) > 0











((1 − e)θ +( 1− θ))

> 0 (25)
11This condition implies 1 − ((1 + ρ)/f (k))φ(e) > 0, which in turn yields ∆ < 1 from (22) and
Γ > 1 from (23). Inspection of (22) shows also that ∆ is positive, implying Ω > 0. Further
manipulations using (20) and (21) show that the inequalities Ω < 1a n dΦ> 1a r ee q u i v a l e n t
to ∆ < Γ, establishing the lemma.
To develop the implications of the lemma, consider the previous equilibrium condition
(12), which deﬁnes the Bf locus. Yakita shows that B
f
e < 0 holds along the Bf locus and that
B
f
k < 0 holds as well provided that a stability condition is satisﬁed (subscripts here denote
partial derivatives).2 These facts imply that the Bf locus is downward sloping, which in
turn implies uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium under federalism, as noted above. The
negativity of these derivatives also means that Bf(k,e) > 0 holds at points lying immediately
to the southwest of the Bf locus, including points in this area that lie on the N locus. But
given uniqueness of the equilbrium, Bf(k,e) must then be positive at all points on the N locus
lying to the southwest of the Bf locus. Otherwise, another point would exist on this portion of
the N locus where Bf(k,e) equals zero, yielding an additional equilibrium. Similarly, Bf(k,e)
must be negative on the N locus everywhere to the northeast of the Bf locus.
Using these conclusions, the following key result can be established:
Proposition 1. In any steady-state equilibrium under the unitary system, k and e are
lower than in the federalist equilibrium. With the proportional rate of economic growth
given by φ(e), it follows that growth is faster under federalism than under the unitary
system.
Proof: Since Ω < 1a n dΦ> 1 hold by the lemma along the Bu locus, it follows that Bf(k,e) >
Bu(k,e) also holds on that locus. Therefore, at a unitary steady state, where the Bu locus
intersects the N locus and Bu(k,e) = 0, the inequality Bf(k,e) > 0 must be satisﬁed. But
by the above argument, such a point must lie to the southwest of the federalist steady-state
equilibrium.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that, because the signs of Bu
k and Bu
e can
be shown to be ambiguous in general (see below), no general statement is possible regarding
the slope of the Bu locus and the uniqueness of the unitary steady state, even though the ﬁgure
shows the locus as downward sloping. While more than one such equilibrium may therefore
12exist, Proposition 1 says that any equilibrium must lie to the southwest of the federalist
equilibrium.
The federalist equilibrium is unique, however, when the utility weight β on the public good
is suﬃciently small. To understand this conclusion, note that the unitary solution approaches
the federalist solution as β approaches zero. In particular, inspection of (20)-(23) shows that
each of the four variables ∆, Γ, Ω and Φ approaches unity as β goes to zero, which implies that
Bu(k,e) in (24) approaches Bf(k,e) in (12). The same convergence occurs with the derivatives
Bu
k and Bu




e as β goes to zero. With Bu
k
and Bu
e thus negative when β is suﬃciently small, it follows that, under this condition, the Bu
locus is downward sloping and the unitary equilibrium is unique.
To understand the intuition underlying Proposition 1, consider the z solutions from above.
Recall that the unitary zt solution from (17) satiﬁes zt
t <z t <z t−1
t ,w h e r ezt
t and zt−1
t are the
time-t public consumption levels of the young and old under federalism, from (6) and (8). This
comparison assumes common values for the remaining variables in the formulas. Updating this
set of inequalities one period yields zt+1
t+1 <z t+1 <z t
t+1. Combining these results then implies
that, conditional on the other variables, the unitary system gives an individual more z than
the federalist system when he is young (zt >z t
t)a n dl e s sz when he is old (zt+1 <z t
t+1). With
head taxes moving in step, after-tax income is thus lower (higher) in the young (old) period
of life under the unitary system than under federalism for given levels of the other variables
(including saving). Thus, with the time path of after-tax income ascending more steeply for a
given level of saving, it follows that the optimal level of saving under the unitary system must
be smaller, as seen in the above comparison of the Bf and Bu functions (their ﬁrst two terms
are proportional to saving).3
As explained in the introduction, adjustments that oﬀset this lower incentive to save are
required to maintain equilibrium in the market for physical capital. One adjustment comes
from a reduction in e, which raises income while young while reducing income in old age.
By ﬂattening the ascending income path, this change restores part of the incentive to save,
helping to restore equilibrium. Its byproduct, though, is a reduction in economic growth. An
additional adjustment is the decline in k, which reduces the required volume of saving.
13It should be noted that Proposition 1 is sensitive to the form of the tax system used to
support public spending. In particular, the growth impact of ﬁscal federalism turns out to be
ambiguous under a proportional income tax system.4 Nevertheless, federalism’s clear impact
under head taxation is noteworthy.
4.2. Comparative statics
Turning to a comparative-static question, recall that the level of the public good chosen
under the unitary system depends on the weighting parameter θ, which determines the relative
inﬂuences of the young and old in that choice (see (15) and (16)). An interesting question then
concerns the eﬀect of changing θ on the rate of economic growth under the unitary system.
To investigate this issue, note ﬁrst that Bu
θ(k,e;θ) is positive, a conclusion that follows from
the inequalities ∂Ω/∂θ > 0a n d∂Φ/∂θ < 0 along with inspection of (24).5 If, in addition,
Bu
e is negative, then the Bu locus shifts up as θ increases (the derivative ∂e/∂θ = −Bu
θ/Bu
e is
positive). But if Bu
k is also negative, then the Bu locus is downward sloping, which means that
its upward shift raises the equilibrium values of both k and e.S i n c eBu
e and Bu
k are negative
from above when β is suﬃciently small, the following result emerges:
Proposition 2. If β is suﬃciently small, then giving more weight to the young in the
choice of z under the unitary system (raising θ) increases the steady-state values of
both k and e, leading to faster economic growth.
Thus, the growth penalty inherent in the unitary system is smaller when the young have a
greater inﬂuence in the choice of z under that system. Although this result may seem natural,
the growth impact of θ is quite indirect, like the link between federalism and growth. To
understand this impact, observe from (17) that an increase in θ reduces zt, holding savings
constant, by putting more weight on the smaller ﬁrst term in brackets, which applies to the
young. But by updating (17) one period and focusing on the steady state, it can be seen
that zt+1 falls by a larger amount when θ increases, given that growth widens the disparity
between young and old terms in (17) in the subsequent period. As a result, for a given level of
saving, an increase in θ reduces after-tax income in both periods but does so by more in old
age, increasing the incentive to save. The optimal level of saving then rises with θ,w h i c hi n
14turn requires oﬀsetting increases in both e and k to maintain equilibrium, as in the previous
explanation.
5. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper suggests that faster economic growth may constitute an ad-
ditional beneﬁt of ﬁscal federalism beyond those already well recognized. This result, which
matches the conjecture of Oates (1993) and the expectations of most empirical researchers
who have studied the issue, arises from an unexpected source: a greater incentive to save when
public-good levels are tailored under federalism to suit the diﬀering demands of young and old
consumers. This eﬀect grows out of a novel interaction between the rules of public-good provi-
sion, which apply cross-sectionally at a given time and involve the young and old consumers of
diﬀerent generations, and the savings decision of a given generation, which is intertemporal in
nature. This cross-sectional/intertemporal interaction yields the link between federalism and
economic growth.
While it is encouraging that the paper’s results match recent empirical ﬁndings showing a
positive growth impact from ﬁscal decentralization, additional theoretical work exploring other
possible sources of such a link is clearly needed. The present results emerge from a model based
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2B
f
e < 0 is established by computing the derivative and eliminating terms using (12) to reach
a negative expression. From (12), B
f













using w  = −kf . After eliminating terms using (12) and carrying out some extensive
manipulations, the above expression reduces to
B
f















(1 − e)f 

. (f1)
(these derivations are not in Yakita’s paper but were provided by him on request). As shown
by Yakita, saddle-path stability of the steady state is ensured by negativity of the term in
brackets in (f1), which also yields B
f
k < 0. Computing Bu
k yields an expression like that in
(f1), which is negative under the stability condition, along with a second expression that
captures the eﬀect of k on the Ω and Φ factors in (12). This second expression is positive,
making the entire derivative ambiguous in sign, an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by fur-
ther manipulations. However, since the second expression converges to zero as β approaches
zero, negativity of Bu
k is ensured under these circumstances. Similar discussion applies to
Bu
e.
3It should be noted that this argument relies on additive separability of the utility func-
tion, which means that adjustment of z does not aﬀect the marginal utility of x, ruling
out feedback eﬀects on the incentive to save. The analysis of Brueckner (1999), which as-
sumed general preferences, required z and x to be weak complements in order to generate
determinate results.
4For simplicity, the income tax is only levied on wage income, excluding the interest income
of the old. While income taxation has no eﬀect under federalism given that income taxes
are equivalent to head taxes in a homogeneous jurisdiction, it makes a diﬀerence under the
unitary system. First, it can be shown that, since the young at time t pay a smaller share
of public-good cost under income taxation, their demand for z exceeds the federalist level
zt
t in (6), while the z demand of the old at time t falls short of the federalist level zt−1
t in
18(8). Next suppose, that the unitary zt under income taxation is set equal to a θ-weighted
average of these demanded z’s, as in (17). Then, it can be shown that, in the steady state,
the time-t tax burden on the young equals θczt
t +( 1− θ)(1 − e)czt−1
t , while the time-t tax
burden of the old equals θczt
t/(1 − e)+( 1− θ)czt−1
t . Note that these expressions are not
weighted averages because of the presence of the (1 − e) terms, which appear because of
unequal cost shares under income taxation. This fact in turn implies that, at time t,t h e
young’s tax burden bears an ambiguous relationship to czt
t, their burden under federalism,
while the tax burden on the old similarly bears an ambiguous relationship to czt−1
t (these
conclusions also hold in the next period). Therefore, unlike in the head-tax case, the unitary
system need not impose a higher tax burden on the young at time t and a lower burden on
the old at time t + 1, relative to the federalist system. As a result, the unitary system’s
eﬀect on saving, and hence on economic growth, is ambiguous.














(α + β)2 > 0,
while ∂Φ/∂θ has the opposite sign.
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